Why India Cannot Trust China

By Khedroob Thondup

Introduction. India’s relationship with China is one of the most consequential in Asia, shaping the future of regional security, trade, and diplomacy. Yet trust between the two nations has remained elusive. From the 1962 war to the Galwan clashes of 2020, China has consistently undermined India’s sovereignty and security. This brief argues that India cannot trust China, not because of paranoia, but because of a demonstrable pattern of aggression, expansionism, and disregard for agreements.

Historical Foundations of Mistrust. 1962 Sino‑Indian War. The war marked the collapse of the “Hindi‑Chini Bhai Bhai” (India‑China brotherhood) narrative. China’s invasion and occupation of Aksai Chin created a permanent territorial fault line. India’s defeat left scars that continue to shape its strategic thinking.

Tibet Annexation. China’s annexation of Tibet in 1950 brought its military presence to India’s doorstep. Tibet, once a buffer state, became a pressure point. Beijing has used Tibet—and the Dalai Lama’s succession—as leverage against India, challenging New Delhi’s moral and strategic position.

Broken Agreements. Confidence‑building measures signed in the 1990s and 2000s—meant to stabilize the Line of Actual Control (LAC)—have been repeatedly violated. China’s disregard for these agreements erodes credibility and reinforces mistrust.

Contemporary Flashpoints. Galwan Valley Clash, 2020. The violent confrontation killed 20 Indian soldiers, exposing China’s willingness to escalate militarily despite prior agreements. It shattered illusions of peace and demonstrated Beijing’s readiness to use force.

Doklam Standoff, 2017. China’s attempt to build roads in disputed territory near Bhutan threatened India’s strategic security. The standoff revealed Beijing’s disregard for regional stability and its intent to alter facts on the ground.

Arunachal Pradesh Claims. China’s insistence that Arunachal Pradesh is “South Tibet” undermines India’s sovereignty. Beijing’s issuance of “stapled visas” to Arunachal residents highlights its refusal to recognize Indian authority.

Strategic Divergence. Geopolitical Rivalry. India’s participation in the Quad (with the U.S., Japan, and Australia) is viewed by Beijing as containment. Conversely, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) encircles India with infrastructure projects in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Nepal.

Economic Dependence. Despite booming trade, India faces a massive deficit with China. Beijing has used economic leverage—such as restrictions on Indian tech firms—to remind New Delhi of its vulnerability.

Pakistan Nexus. China’s deepening ties with Pakistan, including military and nuclear cooperation, directly threaten India’s security. The China‑Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) runs through disputed territory in Gilgit‑Baltistan, undermining India’s sovereignty.

Policy Implications. Border Security. India must continue military modernization and infrastructure development along the LAC. The creation of all‑weather roads, advanced surveillance, and rapid deployment capabilities is essential. Alliance Building. Strengthening ties with the U.S., Japan, Australia, and Europe is critical to balance China’s influence. India’s role in the Quad should be deepened to ensure collective deterrence. Economic Diversification

Reducing reliance on Chinese imports, especially in technology and pharmaceuticals, is vital. India must invest in domestic manufacturing and diversify supply chains.

Tibet Strategy. India should leverage its position as host to the Tibetan exile community to counter China’s narrative. Supporting Tibetan cultural and political rights strengthens India’s moral standing. Indian Ocean Security. Expanding naval presence and partnerships will counter China’s “string of pearls” strategy. India must secure sea lanes and build maritime alliances.

Conclusion. China’s pattern of aggression, expansionism, and disregard for agreements makes trust impossible. India’s policy must be rooted in deterrence, diversification, and alliance building. Engagement with Beijing should remain pragmatic but never naïve.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and should not be attributed to Tibet Express.